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Decision Support Markets: An Innovative Business 
Intelligence Tools 
 
Areej M. Yassin 




The spirit of business intelligence lies at the heart of information markets. This paper advocates the use of information 
markets as business intelligence tools for decision support. It highlights the market promising potentials, and the business 
need for collective intelligence in decision making. Market forecasts can reduce uncertainty surrounding business decisions 
and improve the quality of input into the decision making process, and thus allow managers to make better informed 
decisions. Further, this paper presents a heuristic for traders’ forecasts of events probabilities. This heuristic extracts 
additional information from market transactions by incorporating posted, but not yet executed trades. Utilizing pending 
transactions is hypothesized to generate a more accurate representation of traders’ beliefs than other commonly used 
measures. It might also boost decision makers’ confidence in the market forecasts, and as a result, encourages them to 
embrace it, and make the best out of this invaluable tool.  
Keywords  
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INTRODUCTION 
Information markets are an emerging form of financial markets, whose primary purpose is to aggregate information rather 
than to raise capital, or transfer financial risk (Hanson, 1992). There are many types of information markets. Although they 
differ in many respects, such as market goal, design, and incentives structure (Chen and Plott, 2002; Spann and Skiera, 2003), 
they generally consist of one or more events for which you would like a reliable forecast. Traders in the market wager on 
virtual stock that yield payments based on the event outcomes. The result is a trading price that tracks the consensus opinion 
(Hanson, 1992), and can be interpreted as market-aggregated forecast of the event probability (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2007). 
The incentive structure and the type of contracts used, can elicit the probability, mean or median value of an outcome 
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). For example, a state-contingent contract, aka winner-takes-all, costs a certain amount and 
pays off, for instance, $1 if and only if the event occurs, and nothing otherwise. The price of state-contingent contract is 
constrained between 0-100, and can be interpreted as the event probability. The sum of the prices of the traded state-
contingent contracts should be exactly equal to the payoff of the winning contract (Chen, Fine and Huberman, 2001). 
The idea of using markets for decision support was first introduced by Hanson (Hanson, 1999), where he used the concept of 
decision or conditional markets to illustrate how market forecasts can be used to inform decisions about an event, given 
market predictions of another. Berg, Nelson and Rietz, (2008) provided an elaborate analysis of 1996 presidential election 
market and described how market prices can be used to support decisions, for example, republican voters could have 
supported a stronger candidate with a better chance of beating Clinton.    
This paper advocates the use of information markets as decision support systems inside organizations. Information markets 
have at heart the basic functionality of a business intelligence tool. Their ability to aggregate desperate information scattered 
throughout the organization, and outside its boundaries, to forecast future events, holds great potential for business. The 
market aggregated forecasts can reduce uncertainty and improve the quality of input into the decision making process. Thus, 
allowing managers to make better informed decisions. This paper presents a heuristic for traders’ beliefs about the outcomes’ 
likelihood of occurrence based on their market transactions. This heuristic takes into account pending transactions in the 
market because, at different points in time, they might trap valuable information from being incorporated into the price. We 
hypothesize that the proposed heuristic will outperform other commonly used techniques such as maximum price, average 
price and others, and will be a more accurate representation of trader’s beliefs. We also hypothesize that the availability of 
multiple predictive measures, such as the proposed heuristic, and other commonly used statistics, will boost decision makers’ 
confidence in the market predictions and consequently, their willingness to incorporate them into their decisions. 
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The paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews current information aggregation and forecasting methods used in 
organizations along with their limitations. The use of information markets as business intelligence tools is advocated next. 
After that we review some successful applications of information markets in variety of domains. Our proposed heuristic and 
hypotheses are presented next. The conclusions and future directions section concludes this article.   
INFORMATION AGGREGATION METHODS 
Organizations employ different methods to aggregate information held by group members. When the issues at hand are 
purely factual, statistical groups can be used by asking a large group of individuals and calculating the statistical mean or 
median of their answers (Sunstein, 2005). However, when the group is anchored by a misleading number or the group 
members are ignorant to the issue at hand, individuals are more likely to be wrong than right, and the likelihood that the 
group will decide correctly falls to zero as the size of the group increases (Sunstein, 2005). 
Alternatively, deliberation can be used to improve group decision making through discussions and debates, especially when 
the issues are normative rather than factual (Sunstein, 2005). Armstrong (Armstrong, 2006) presented the case against face-
to-face meetings demonstrating how ineffective and inefficient traditional group meetings are at aggregating information. 
Groups often produce inaccurate outcomes because of informational and social influences that impair group judgment by 
emphasizing shared information, creating hidden profiles, cascade effects, and group polarization (Sunstein, 2005). 
In addition, individual group members have limited information processing capabilities, and therefore rely on heuristics such 
as representativeness, availability, framing, anchoring and adjustment to reduce the cognitive load of predicting values or 
assessing probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The use of heuristics reduces complex tasks to much simpler 
judgmental tasks, creating biases and errors in individual judgments that are propagated and often amplified in group settings.     
The Delphi method is utilized to diminish the informational and social influences of deliberative groups. The Delphi 
technique uses a self administered questionnaire and a system of controlled feedback, where a group of experts participate in 
anonymous rounds of estimates and feedback until the degree of convergence reach a desired threshold. Members are 
allowed to communicate their judgments and conclusions anonymously in a form of summary statistics, along with their 
justification and reasoning behind them. Experts can then respond to the forecasts and justifications of others, and revise their 
own based on the feedback they receive. Finally the individual judgments are statistically aggregated (Armstrong, 2001).   
Rowe and Wright, (1999) reviewed 25 empirical studies that evaluated the effectiveness of the Delphi method in terms of 
forecasts accuracy and quality. Their review showed that Delphi outperformed both statistical and interactive groups roughly 
over 80% of the time. Although the Delphi technique proved to improve forecasting and decision making, it has its own 
limitations. In addition to the possible difficultly of recruiting experts in any area of interest, Delphi does not have an 
incentive structure to motivate experts to reveal their true beliefs. Also Delphi does not allow incorporation of additional 
information into the forecasts because it offers results only at a certain point in time.  
MARKETS AS BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE TOOLS 
The key to any business intelligence tool is the ability to aggregate information from many sources, summarize it into 
meaningful measures, and display it appropriately in terms of form, and level of granularity. Perhaps the capabilities of 
business intelligence tools have changed dramatically since the term was first coined by Luhn in his 1958 seminal piece, but 
the main objective of BI tools is, and will always be, to inform decisions.  
Business Intelligence tools can uncover trends or patterns that were previously unknown, and improve the quality of inputs to 
the decision making process (Negash, 2004). They can also forecast future events such as product sales, market trends and 
project delivery dates, and provide managers with a realistic view of current conditions to improve management 
understanding of current situations, or help managers form more realistic expectations of performance.   
The spirit of business intelligence lies at the heart of information markets. Much of the enthusiasm for using information 
markets as a method for eliciting forecasts, and aggregating information held by individual members of an organization, 
came from the strong-held belief in the power of collective intelligence to overcome the limitations of the various 
aforementioned methods of forecasting and information aggregation.  
Teams and individuals of an organization oftentimes feel they do not have enough information, or insight to inform business 
decisions, such those related to demand forecasting, market assessment, and production planning. Information markets can be 
used to transfer information and intelligence from those who have it, to those who need it to make decisions (Hopman, 2007). 
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The ability of markets to aggregate information dispersed among individuals can be traced back to Adam Smith and his 
invisible hand theory (1976). The invisible hand process works via free markets and division of labor where outcomes are 
produced in a decentralized way, with no explicit agreements between thousands of independent, utility maximizing agents, 
whose aims are neither coordinated nor identical with the actual outcome, yet bringing wealth to their nations.  
This vision of decentralized planning of economies that secures the best use of knowledge in society is what Hayek (Hayek, 
1945) believed can be maintained only through the free markets price system. Thus, in a society where individuals, spatially 
separated from each other (decentralized), each has only partial local knowledge, and their thoughts and believes are diverse 
and independent, it does not matter if only few knew about a certain circumstance, as long as they all act and think 
independently seeking their self interest, free markets can collect, coordinate and ensure cooperation where the whole act as 
one bringing about a collective wisdom purified from cognitive problems of those few (Surowiecki, 2004). 
Green, Armstrong and Graefe, (2007) discussed how information markets can avoid the drawbacks of existing methods such 
as Delphi. For example, participants self select to participate in the market if they believe their private information is not yet 
incorporated in the market price. Also the market provides continuous forecast as more information get incorporated in the 
price, and offers continuous incentives for true revelation of beliefs, where traders can benefit financially by buying and 
selling according to their beliefs.    
MARKETS SUCCESS STORIES 
While research on information markets has witnessed an exponential growth in the number of published articles in the last 
ten years (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007), information markets have been around for a long time. Betting on political 
outcomes has a long tradition in the United States, with large and formal markets, such as the New York betting market, 
operating for over three-quarters of a century. These markets had a remarkable predictive accuracy and had an astonishingly 
large volume of activity, which at times dominated stock exchange transactions on Wall Street (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004).   
Today, Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), the most well known application of information markets, is offering markets in 
which traders can bet on a wide variety of events ranging from the outcomes of presidential elections to the periodic interest 
rate decisions of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee (Hahn and Tetlock, 2006). Since 1988, prices on the IEM 
have proved more accurate than traditional polls in forecasting elections more than 75 percent of the time (Forsythe, Nelson, 
Neumann and Wright, 1992; Hahn and Tetlock, 2006). 
The Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) is another successful application of information markets. Traders in the HSX buy and 
sell shares of their favorite actors or movies causing securities’ prices to rise or fall. Prices of securities are used to predict 
Oscar, Emmy, and Grammy award winners and movie box office returns and they prove to be highly correlated with actual 
award outcomes. According to the most recent HSX press release, players correctly predicted 29 of 37 Oscar nominees for 
the 81st Annual Academy Awards, with a 78.4% success rate, bringing HSX’ 11 year average to an impressive 82.1%. 
There is a large and growing number of Web-based information markets designed to aggregate information and forecast 
events in a number of areas, including sports, politics, finance, law, entertainment, and even the weather. Some examples 
include NewsFutures, Intrade, TradeSports, Inkling Markets, Goldman Sachs and the Foresight Exchange. Other examples of 
regulated derivative markets are HedgeStreet and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  
In 2006, over 25 companies in the United States had started to experiment with information markets, including Yahoo, 
Google, Microsoft, GE and HP (King, 2006), to forecast sales, predict which products will be successful, and to help make 
business decisions. For example, Chen and Plott (2002) described series of experiments conducted at Hewlett-Packard 
laboratories for the purpose of forecasting sales resulting in the market outperforming HP forecasts 75% of the time.  
Ortner (1997, 1998) ran an experiment using information markets at Siemens Austria to explore the potential use of such 
markets to support project management decisions. The experiment was designed to forecast delays and reveal information 
about the project progress resulting in market prices anticipating delays long before the official release of information. These 
results demonstrated a satisfactory forecasting potential of these markets in supporting project management decisions.  
Intel integrated an information market designed to forecast demand into the company’s standard forecasting processes. The 
results of early experiments showed that market forecasts are stable, responded well to demand fluctuations, and at least as 
accurate as the official forecasts, with 75% of market forecasts falling within 2.7% of actual sales (Hopman, 2007). In 
addition to using the market to generate forecasts, Cowgill, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2008), analyzed Google’s internal 
prediction market and showed how the market can be used to track information flow within the organization and how it 
responds to external events.  
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HEURISTIC FOR BELIEFS    
Information markets indeed avoid the bulk of drawbacks of other methods (Sunstein, 2005; Green et al., 2007), and the 
aforementioned experiments demonstrate the feasibility of using information markets in a business environment.  
However, it is important to note that the market efficacy should not be measured based on the price predictive accuracy. The 
market itself does not predict the future, traders do. The market merely aggregates what the traders know. In other words, it is 
possible to have an inaccurate price forecast that is highly reflective of the mean belief. Thus, regardless of whether the price 
is an accurate forecast of an event probability or not, as long as the market aggregates information and the price reflects the 
market’s mean belief, the market is considered a success.  
This paper introduces a heuristic for traders’ beliefs about events probabilities. This heuristic is based on their trading 
behavior as demonstrated by their executed and pending transactions in various outcomes in the market.  Drawing from our 
knowledge base, it is assumed, according to the efficient market hypothesis and rational expectations theory, that efficient 
markets aggregate all available information driving the price to a rational expectations equilibrium, which theoretically 
should reflect the mean belief. Empirically, markets are not perfect information transmission and aggregation systems, and 
hence the price does not always reflect all the information in the market (Grossman and Stiglitz 1976; Noeth, Camerer, Plott, 
and Webber, 1999; Plott, 2000). As a matter of fact, the degree to which markets aggregate information, and prices accurately 
reflect the mean belief, is still an open question.  
Prices do leave unaggregated information in the form of pending transactions in the market. Traders submit orders based on 
their beliefs, and their beliefs will not get incorporated into the price unless their orders get executed, and due to liquidity 
issues, market thinness, or homogeneity of beliefs, this may never happen. Our hypothesis is that an aggregated measure that 
takes pending transactions into account, is a more accurate representation of traders’ beliefs, and may generate more accurate 
predictions of actual outcomes, than other commonly used measures such as the last trade price, maximum price, average 
price and volume-averaged transaction price. 
For each trader (Ti) in the market, calculate her/his belief in each outcome probability of occurrence using the following 
heuristic: 
 
Pi (Sj ) = Money invested (MI) in Sj + Money willing to invest (MW) in Sj 
                                                                                 B 
 
Where the amount of money invested (MI) in an outcome (Sj) equals the number of shares bought in the outcome times the 
price paid for each (e.g. 2@10 =$20). The amount of money the trader is willing to invest (MW) in an outcome (Sj) equals the 
number of shares s/he is trying to buy (pending transactions) times the price s/he is willing to pay for each. B is the trader’s 
bank in the market. All traders start with an equal endowment of credits or money in their banks at the beginning of each 
trading period.   
For each trader (Ti):  
(MI in S1+MW in S1 )+ (MI in S2+MW in S2)+ …+ (MI in Sj+ MW in Sj ) < = B 
And  
Pi (S1) + Pi (S2) +…+ Pi (Sj) < = 1  
Traders’ beliefs calculated using the above heuristic will be updated automatically whenever new bids are posted.    
The issue of price proximity to the market mean belief, is also directly related to an important open question in information 
markets; how to limit manipulation (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006). What makes markets vulnerable to manipulation is our 
reliance on the last trade price as a forecast of an event probability, where all it takes is a group of traders acting collusively 
to influence the price (Hansen, Schmidt and Strobel, 2004; Hanson, Oprea and Porter, 2006; Rhode and Strumpf, 2006).  
While it is hard to prevent manipulation, it is still possible to detect it. Having an alternative measure of traders beliefs 
available to decision makers, along with the last trade price, can significantly reduce their anxiety about the possibility of 
having an abnormally inflated or deflated price. Thus, the availability of this aggregated measure, in addition to the price, can 
serve as an assurance method to the price representativeness of beliefs. It is conjectured that this measure will boost decision 
markers confidence in the market price, and as a result, their willingness to base their decision on it will also increase.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This paper contributes to the information systems literature by advocating the use of information markets as a business 
intelligence tool for managerial decision support. It highlights the market great potentials and the business need for collective 
intelligence in decision making.  It also proposes a new heuristic for traders’ beliefs that attempts to extract additional 
information from pending market transactions. To our knowledge, our proposed heuristic is the first to utilize posted but not 
yet executed market transactions.  
This paper is the first step in a long term research project that aims to identify ways of making this innovative business 
intelligence tool more useful to managers. As part of a larger study, we intend to test the effectiveness of the proposed 
heuristic in predicting the actual outcomes compared to other techniques such as last trade price, maximum price, average 
price and volume-averaged transaction price. We also intend to test the impact of the availability of multiple predictive 
statistics, such as the proposed heuristic, last trade prices and other measures, on decision makers’ confidence in market 
predictions, and on their willingness to incorporate them into the decision making process. We hypothesize that the 
availability of multiple measures will boost decision makers’ confidence in the market predictions and will help clear or 
confirm doubts on whether or not it has been manipulated. We also hypothesize that the proposed heuristic will outperform 
other commonly used measures of traders’ beliefs such as average price, maximum price and others. 
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